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Morality as Interpretation* 
Joseph Razt 
With the growing interest in interpretation as an activity essential in the study 
of the arts and of society it was inevitable that the question of the relation between 
morality and interpretation would attract considerable interest. Given that moral 
views and arguments are expressed in language, are essentially language bound, 
there is no doubt that the understanding of moral views and argument involves, 
at least at times, interpretation (of arguments and propositions, etc.). The same 
can be said of physics. The question is whether morality is interpretative in a 
way in which physics is not. Some writers have claimed that it is. I will examine 
the claims and arguments to that effect advanced by Michael Walzer, though 
much of my argument will be general and not limited to the arguments he 
explicitly advances.' 
THE MAIN THESES 
At the beginning of his book Walzer declares his intention to defend the view 
that "the path of interpretation" in moral philosophy is the one that "accords 
best with our everyday experience of morality" (p. 3).2 Later on, he explains: 
What we do when we argue is to give an account of the actually existing 
morality. That morality is authoritative for us because it is only by virtue 
of its existence that we exist as the moral beings we are. Our categories, 
relationships, commitments, and aspirations are all shaped by, expressed 
in terms of, the existing morality. [P. 21] 
One might say that the moral world is authoritative for us because it 
provides us with everything we need to live a moral life, including the 
capacity for reflection and criticism.... The capacity for criticism always 
* A review of Michael Walzer, Interpretation a d Social Criticism (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1987). References to this book will appear parenthetically in the 
text. 
t This article grew out of a discussion at the Hartman Institute in Jerusalem (in June 
1989) in which I criticized Walzer's views along the lines elaborated upon here. In writing 
the article I benefited from contributions tothat discussion by Amos Funkenstein, Sydney 
Morgenbesser, Hilary Putnam, and Michael Walzer. 
1. Walzer himself does not draw the contrast with physics. 
2. Strictly speaking, he only claims there that it is better than what he calls the paths 
of discovery and invention. His description of those suggests that his targets are some 
forms of moral realism (discovery) and constructivism, or contractarianism (invention). His 
main argument is, however, a positive one, supporting the path of interpretation, rather 
than merely an argument for the comparative superiority of the path of interpretation. 
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extends beyond the "needs" of the social structure itself and its dominant 
groups. I do not want to defend a functional position. The moral world 
and the social world are more or less coherent. Morality is always potentially 
subversive of class and power. [Pp. 21-22] 
The general question about the right thing to do is quickly turned into 
some more specific question-about the career open to talents, let's say, 
and then about equal opportunity, affirmative action, and quotas. These 
... require us to argue about what a career is, what sorts of talents we 
ought to recognise, whether equal opportunity is a "right." . . . These ques- 
tions are pursued within a tradition of moral discourse-indeed they only 
arise within that tradition-and they are pursued by interpreting the terms 
of that discourse. The argument is about ourselves; the meaning of our 
way of life is what is at issue. The general question we finally answer is 
not quite the one we asked at first. It has a crucial addition: what is the 
right thing for us to do? [P. 23] 
Walzer's argument is based on the assumption that some moral claims are 
better, or better founded, than others. This does not commit him to the view 
that all moral statements are either true or false, but it commits him to holding 
that some moral claims are true and some false. Where a moral claim is better 
founded than another, the statement hat it is, is true, and its denial false. Moreover, 
in such cases various statements entailed by the precept that people should act 
in accordance with the better claim are, presumably, true too.3 
Given this assumption, Walzer advances one major and one subsidiary thesis: 
Ti: Arguments in moral philosophy are interpretations of the morality 
that exists. 
T2: Even so, there is plenty of room for social criticism. 
Three main intuitions inspire the theses. First, and most important, is the 
view that morality is socially dependent, that is, that what is right and wrong for 
a person to do, what is good or bad, laudable or deplorable, virtuous or revealing 
of moral defects in character, etc., depends on social practices. Second, morality 
does not form a system of principles and precepts arranged in some logical way 
(in the way in which, e.g., Rawls's theory of justice is a system), nor is there a 
special method (like decision behind a veil of ignorance, or the test of the categorical 
imperative) for discovering or testing moral claims. Third, our society is not the 
only morally decent society that ever existed. Nor is it the morally best society 
that ever existed, with other societies mere stages of imperfection compared with 
us. Nor are other morally decent societies in the past or in the present necessarily 
more like ours than those societies that are less morally appealing, that is, there 
are ways of being moral and having a morally decent environment which are 
very unlike our ways of being morally decent, and in environments very unlike 
ours. 
These statements of the intuitions are very vague. The degree to which the 
intuitions are controversial depends on their more precise formulations. Few 
people deny that what is rude, arnd therefore on occasion immoral, depends on 
3. As the statement of Walzer's assumption above makes clear, his view is consistent 
with the existence of a widespread moral incommensurability, leading to considerable truth 
value gaps. The general drift of his argument suggests that he regards intrasocial moral 
issues as largely morally determinate, while contemplating extensive moral incommen- 
surability where intersocial comparisons are in question. 
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social practices. Many deny that the content of morality is exclusively determined 
by the social practices of, let us say, the society to which the person whose conduct 
or character are under consideration belongs. Few people believe that morality 
is a deductive system in which all true conclusions follow from one simple principle 
with the addition of purely factual premises. Many believe that all cogent moral 
precepts are to some degree interdependent. 
Walzer's theses, especially the first and main one, are an attempt to give a 
more precise articulation to the intuitions. The arguments for the theses are also 
arguments for the intuitions. I will not challenge or discuss the underlying intuitions. 
The only matter under examination is the thesis that moral arguments are in- 
terpretative. In challenging this thesis I will be challenging that way of understanding 
and explaining the intuitions. But none of the following arguments is directed 
against the intuitions themselves. It is possible to argue that the best verdict on 
Walzer's theses is "not proven." There is too much which is left obscure in Walzer's 
discussion to enable one to reach any substantive conclusion. In particular, it is 
unclear what he refers to when he speaks of moral argument being "an inter- 
pretation of the morality that exists." Three clusters of questions remain unresolved. 
First, which of the existing moralities does he have in mind? We generally 
assume that different moralities are practiced or at least avowed (and therefore 
can be said to exist) in different societies, and, in pluralistic societies, different 
moralities are practiced or avowed by different sections of the population within 
a single society. This brief statement is itself merely an abbreviated description 
of a much more complex phenomenon of divisions and crosscurrents. Which of 
the different moralities which exist is interpreted in valid moral arguments? 
Second, what kind of interpretation is involved in moral argument? Consider 
some of the activities generally referred to as interpretative, such as that of 
professional interpreters in multilingual international conventions, the interpre- 
tation of musical compositions by conductors, soloists, or orchestras, the inter- 
pretation of historical events at the hands of historians, the interpretation of 
poems by literary critics, the interpretation of dreams by psychoanalysts, the 
interpretation of experimental data by natural scientists, and the interpretation 
of legislation by the courts, to mention but a few examples. One need not hold 
that there is nothing common to them all which merits describing all of them as 
interpretations to suspect that these multifarious activities differ in important 
respects. In particular, the standards by which an interpretation isjudged successful 
or not seem to differ. In some cases success is a matter of all or nothing; in others 
it is a matter of degree. In some cases mutually incompatible interpretations may 
be equally successful; in others there can be only one (complete) best interpretation. 
In some cases a good interpretation is an artistic reation. In others it is a matter 
of scientific onjecture or of logical deduction. Without knowing what kind of 
interpretation moral argument is meant to be, it is difficult o evaluate the thesis 
that it is interpretative.4 
Third, does Walzer mean moral argument to be an interpretation of the 
morality that exists to the exclusion of other aspects of existing culture and social 
practices? To assume so is to assume that morality can be hived off from the rest 
4. Saying that it is an interpretation of a social practice, if that is what Walzer has in 
mind, does not help, as this kind, far from being a culturally recognized brand of interpretation, 
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of culture and from other social practices. It further assumes that these other 
practices do not logically affect the content of morality.5 
Some aspects of these questions will be taken up below. But in the main I 
will disregard them. There are, I will argue, difficulties with the thesis that moral 
arguments are interpretations of the morality that exists which transcend these 
weighty problems, and which can receive at least a preliminary consideration 
even before they are resolved. 
Before turning to the examination of the theses we must confront the ques- 
tion of their status, especially that of the first, the interpretative thesis. Is the 
thesis that moral argument is interpretative a thesis about valid or successful 
moral arguments, that is, about what moral arguments should be like? Or is the 
thesis a statement of the nature of the run-of-the-mill moral arguments which 
are made in conversations and discussions among people, in committees, in the 
media, etc.? Or is it a statement of the nature of the arguments to be found in 
the writings of moral philosophers? Or, finally, is it itself an interpretation of 
common moral arguments, or alternatively, of the arguments of moral philos- 
ophers? 
In spite of some hesitation on the part of Walzer on this point, there is only 
one possible answer. The interpretative thesis can only be an interpretation of 
common moral arguments, both philosophical and other. To start with the thesis 
cannot be a claim about which moral arguments are cogent without being a claim 
about (at least some) existing moral arguments unless it is coupled with the claim 
that no cogent moral arguments have ever been advanced. This is not a claim 
that Walzer makes, nor is it a plausible claim to make. But very few people, if 
any, have ever advanced moral arguments they engaged in as interpretative, and 
there is no reason to think that no moral argument which was put forward as a 
non-interpretative argument was ever cogent. So the thesis cannot be a simple 
description of (at least some) moral arguments. To be plausible at all, it has to 
be taken as an interpretation of (at least some) moral arguments. 
Can it be taken as interpreting only cogent moral arguments? This can be 
the case only if the feature of a moral argument which enables one to interpret 
it as interpretative is a feature which occurs in (all) cogent arguments and is 
missing in all the others. This is not the way Walzer perceives the situation. The 
quotation above concerning the way an argument regarding affirmative action 
might proceed is not meant to apply only to cogent arguments about affirmative 
action. It fixes on the fact that such arguments proceed through an appeal to 
notions such as equal opportunities, careers open to talents, etc. Clearly both 
good and bad arguments have been advanced in these terms. This example shows 
how unlikely it is that the features of arguments which enable one to interpret 
them as interpretative will apply to all and only to cogent arguments. It follows 
that since the thesis must apply to cogent moral arguments, it must apply to (at 
least some) existing moral arguments, and it follows from that that it must apply 
to cogent and non-cogent moral arguments, that is, that it is a thesis about the 
proper interpretation of moral arguments generally.6 
It also follows that the thesis cannot apply only to philosophical moral argu- 
ments. If philosophical moral arguments are cogent only if they are interpretative, 
5. I owe this point to Hilary Putnam. 
6. Though it may allow that some moral arguments, perhaps even some cogent ones, 
are not interpretations. 
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then it cannot be the case that there are cogent nonphilosophical moral arguments 
which are not interpretative. Itfollows that either there cannot be nonphilosophical 
cogent moral arguments or they are interpretative. Given that nonphilosophical 
arguments either reflect or partly constitute the morality that exists, if no non- 
philosophical moral arguments are cogent, it is a mystery how it could be that 
the interpretation of the morality that exists can yield cogent moral arguments. 
So we must conclude that the interpretative thesis is itself an interpretation of 
moral arguments (philosophical and nonphilosophical, cogent and faulty) generally. 
THE NON-IDENTITY RESULT 
Walzer dedicates much attention to his auxiliary thesis, that is, that the interpretative 
thesis is compatible with social criticism. Much of his discussion is cultural historical 
and has no philosophical relevance. Walzer's examples show that various cultures 
recognize a social role which can be described as that of a social critic, that is, 
someone who is part of the core of the society and its culture and criticizes it 
from the inside, invoking its own shared values as the grounds of his criticism. 
For reasons we need not go into, Walzer is anxious to show that a society can be 
criticized by insiders from the inside. In his discussion of the phenomenon he 
underplays the features which make it special and contingent and creates the 
impression that in his view all sound moral criticism of a society is of this kind. 
For example, if he does not altogether fail to notice, at the very least he underplays 
the fact that his illustrations of the critic as an insider are drawn from societies 
during periods in which their social practices recognized that position. Other 
societies do not. They regard any substantial social criticism as betrayal and hold 
that by engaging in radical criticism, even when it sincerely claims to be inspired 
by common values, the critic has excluded himself from the social fold and has 
shown himself to be allied with the enemies of the society he criticizes. The 
possible existence of Walzer's social critic is contingent on the practices of the 
society concerned. 
Furthermore, Walzer fails to separate the social historical phenomenon which 
interests him, that is, the possibility of the socially recognized role of a social 
critic as an insider, from the philosophical problem he is trying to tackle. His 
philosophical aim is to show that the morality that exists contains grounds for 
moral criticism. The philosophical aim of the auxiliary thesis is to defend the 
interpretative thesis from the charge that it is conservative. The charge of con- 
servatism should not be seen as a simple moral accusation of holding morally 
mistaken views. Rather it is meant to show that the interpretative thesis is a 
mistaken interpretation of moral arguments. Some moral arguments can and do 
lead to radical criticism of societies, their institutions and practices. Any account 
of moral arguments which makes such criticism unintelligible is mistaken. Ap- 
parently accepting this point, Walzer claims that his view of moral arguments as 
interpretations of existing morality is consistent with radical social criticism by 
social critics. 
But this is an inadequate reply to the attempted refutation of the interpretative 
thesis. Until we are shown that an insider's criticism is the only intelligible form 
of criticism, the question is bound to remain, Does the interpretative thesis allow 
room for all forms of criticism of a society that are intelligible? What of the 
widespread condemnation across the world of the massacre of students supporting 
the democracy movement in Beijing in June 1989 (the Tienanmen Square ex- 
ample)? Many of the critics were outsiders to the society the actions of whose 
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government were condemned, and few of them bothered even to consider the 
question whether their criticism can be borne out by an interpretation of Chinese 
values. Most of them, one suspects, would regard that question as irrelevant to 
the cogency of their criticism. Let us assume that their criticism is intelligible 
and cogent, and an example of a common kind of moral claim. If so, then the 
interpretative thesis is acceptable only if it can show that such moral criticism, 
which is not the social criticism Walzer's second thesis addresses, is based on 
interpretative arguments.7 Some aspects of these arguments will resurface later. 
For the present I wish only to emphasize that they are not meant as a refutation 
of Walzer's view. They merely show that if the interpretative thesis is to be shown 
to be viable, a stronger thesis than T2 needs to be established, that is, that moral 
criticism generally is consistent with the view that moral arguments are an inter- 
pretation of existing morality. 
Leaving this point on one side, there is one conclusion of Walzer's auxiliary 
thesis (even in the limited scope he gives it) which is crucial for the validity of 
his views. Walzer's thesis is that the interpretative thesis leaves room for social 
(which is a form of moral) criticism. Moral criticism of what? It clearly leaves 
room for criticizing society and its institutions for failing to live up to the morality 
that exists. On the assumption' that the morality that exists is nothing but the 
morality of the society criticized, saying that society and its institutions can be 
criticized by the existing morality is no more than saying that society may fail to 
live up to its own moral ideals. To affirm that is no more than to affirm the 
possibility of hypocrisy, duplicity, bad faith, self-deception, etc. But if this is all 
that T2 establishes, then it fails to do its job in defending the interpretative thesis 
from the charge of a conservatism which makes the possibility of many moral 
arguments unintelligible. To rebut this criticism T2 must show that there can 
be social criticism of social morality itself. 
Many moral arguments are addressed against various aspects of the morality 
that exists. Vegetarians and environmentalists criticize the existing morality con- 
cerning our attitude to nonhuman animals and to the natural environment. 
Feminists criticize the existing morality concerning the relations between the 
sexes and gender roles. Examples of moral arguments from within a society, that 
is, ones which can qualify as social criticism addressed at the existing morality 
of the society concerned, are legion. And so are the moral arguments addressed 
against the existing moralities of foreign countries. Admittedly, the notion of an 
existing morality is problematical. There is no need, however, to attempt a com- 
prehensive clarification of this idea. All we need are two assumptions clearly 
made by Walzer, namely, first, that the existing morality is positively correlated 
to the moral beliefs of people, and to at least some of their social practices. 
Second, that different moralities exist in different societies (however societies 
7. Alternatively, Walzer might show that the Tienanmen Square example belongs to 
an exceptional non-interpretative kind of argument. This line of argument is unpromising. 
Those British people who condemned the massacre in Beijing are likely to have felt that 
they would have condemned a massacre in Trafalgar Square for exactly the same reasons, 
and that those reasons are typical of many of their moral considerations when applied to 
conditions in British jails, for example, or to administrative detention in Northern Ireland. 
This makes it difficult o regard the Tienanmen Square example as displaying a special 
kind of moral argument. 
8. To be considered below. 
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may be individuated). I will therefore assume that T2 asserts among other things 
that the interpretative thesis leaves room for a criticism of the morality that exists. 
It follows from this understanding of T2 that morality is not identical with 
(any) existing morality. One can avoid this conclusion only by holding (1) that 
morality can change, and (2) that morality may be inconsistent. I will demonstrate 
these points by showing how T2 and the identity assumption yield the two 
mentioned conclusions. 
Moral Change 
First, I will show that if existing moralities can be morally criticized, sometimes 
successfully, then existing morality can change. If existing morality is morality, 
then morality can change. To show that this is so, we have to distinguish cases 
of (alleged) moral advance in which previously held views and previous practices 
are rejected as mistaken, from moral change in which they are rejected on the 
ground that while they were right for their time, they are no longer valid. If 
moral criticism of existing morality, the possibility of which is asserted by Walzer 
in T2, can be sound, then morality must be capable of developing away from its 
criticized condition. This does not assume that every or any sound criticism of 
morality will be effective in generating such a development. It merely assumes 
that such a development is logically possible, that it is coherent. This means that 
the possibility of sound moral criticism of existing morality presupposes that 
either moral advance or moral change (or both) is possible. 
But on the identity assumption, there is no possibility of moral advance in 
existing morality,9 for moral advance assumes that the morality that exists now 
is right and the morality that it displaced was wrong. That last assumption is 
precisely what the identity thesis denies. Since (tautologically) morality is correct 
morality if existing morality is morality, then existing morality (at any given point 
in time) is correct, and cannot be wrong. Therefore, if morality is existing morality, 
moral advance is impossible. As we saw, this means that if sound criticism of 
existing morality is possible, then so is moral change. 
It is a commonplace of much moral philosophy that while people's moral 
views and practices may change, morality cannot. It is not obvious how precisely 
one should understand the no-change principle. Clearly, there can be some moral 
change. When I was young, for example, it was morally wrong for me to drive 
a car. Now it is morally permissible for me to do so. Before the age of rapid 
transport it was wrong for a person with ailing parents to go fifty miles away 
from home, for he would not have been able to get back home in a hurry if 
needed. Today the moral situation has changed. Some moral changes reflect 
changes in customs and mores rather than in technology. In what sense can 
morality be supposed to be unchanging? 
The following seems a promising way of understanding the issue of moral 
change. Any moral change is explained by reference to the effect of a change 
on unchanging principles. It is wrong to drive when one does not possess the 
skill and capacities to control safety the vehicle one is driving. Children do not 
9. This is, of course, consistent with individual moral advance. That is, the argument 
shows only that existing morality cannot morally advance, for that would entail attributing 
to it moral mistakes. No problems are involved with the thought that individuals may fall 
prey to moral mistakes and may make genuine advances by ridding themselves of such 
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possess the required judgment, strength, and skills. Adults normally do. One has 
a duty to aid one's parents when they are ill. Therefore, one should make sure 
that one is in a position to do so. Before the advent of modern transport this 
meant remaining close to home at times when one's parents were ill. Today, with 
rapid transport, this is no longer true; the material distances are not the same. 
If any moral change presupposes an unchanging moral background, then morality 
can be said to be unchanging. 
Nothing in this argument assumes that there are ultimate unchanging moral 
principles. It is possible that any given principle is capable of change, since there 
is a possibility of indefinite regress. Even the principles which appear to us most 
unmovable may turn out to be suited to certain circumstances and not to others. 
But to make sense of that will require pointing to an unchanging moral doctrine 
in terms of which changing circumstances can account for the moral change. 
Furthermore, nothing in this argument presupposes that there is a clear division 
between facts and values. It is not assumed that any moral change is accounted 
for by a change of facts against a background of unchanging morality, if that is 
a coherent doctrine. Only a difference, relative to every instance of moral change, 
between changing circumstances and unchanging principles is assumed. 
Must there be a way of explaining moral change? Perhaps all that one can 
say of moral change is that something was right until now and something different 
and incompatible is right from now (the boundary need not be precise), and that 
is it. There may be no explanation of the change. But to say this is to accept that 
morality is unintelligible to us. If in principle we can explain, if we can make 
intelligible why one thing is right from today, we must also be able to explain 
why it was not right before. Presumably, the explanation of what makes it right 
now does not apply to the time up to now. So it provides the constant which 
explains change. If it does apply to the time up to now and yet we hold that in 
spite of that, what is right from now was not right before, then it is a mystery 
in what sense the explanation explains why this is right from now. By that 
explanation the same was right before now as well. So at best it is an incomplete 
explanation. So, short of giving up the intelligibility of morality, an explanation 
of moral change where it occurs must be in principle available. 
Must such an explanation proceed through finding a constant element which 
makes some changing feature of the situation account for the moral change? I 
cannot see what else is possible. The only escape from this conclusion seems to 
me to be that the constant element which explains moral change need not itself 
be a moral consideration or principle. But I cannot think of an account showing 
how it could be anything else. 
Can there be a special kind of moral change which is interpretative change, 
which does not presuppose a persisting moral principle? This kind of change 
might occur when members of a society reinterpret heir previous practices and 
beliefs and come to see them in a new light (leading to a change of both practices 
and beliefs). This may be possible, but it leaves open the question: From their 
new perspective can they think of their previous views (i.e., their interpretations) 
as having been wrong and supplanted by better ones, or must they think of them 
as having been right for their time but now superseded by something which is 
right for the new times? Interpretative change does not escape the considerations 
advanced above. 
My argument is (a) that the possibility of moral criticism of existing morality 
entails, on the identity assumption, that there is moral change, and (b) that any 
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moral change presupposes an unchanging moral background. Is there any conflict 
between the two conclusions? Since b allows considerable room for moral change, 
there is conflict only if a requires the possibility of moral change of a kind which 
the argument above does not allow. That it does is not obvious. The limits of 
moral change I have argued for do not immunize any particular moral principle 
from the change. It is true that T2 by itself is consistent with forms of moral 
change which are inconsistent with the argument I advanced. For example, it is 
consistent with the possibility that existing Morality will be so radically transformed 
that it will have nothing in common with its ancestor. Or that it will change with 
regard to its most abstract principles, continuity being provided at the level of 
middle-range principles. This second possibility seems to be in line with much 
of what we know of changes in moral practices and beliefs. It also seems very 
much in tune with the spirit of the general views of supporters of the interpretative 
thesis, including Walzer. The lesson of my argument is that if such changes in 
existing morality are to be entertained, then morality cannot be identified with 
social morality. 
Morality and Inconsistency 
Whatever one's view regarding moral change, the non-identity of morality with 
existing morality, given T2, follows straightforwardly from a simple argument: 
T2 states that there can be moral criticism of existing morality. If morality is 
existing morality, then existing morality provides grounds for criticizing itself. 
This means more than that the practices which constitute or which underpin 
existing morality contain the seeds for their own transformation. This last claim 
is an unexceptional claim that certain social practices are unstable. Social theory 
has done much to explain the various structures which make social practices 
intrinsically unstable. But T2, on the identity assumption, claims more. It states 
that existing morality contains propositions which are grounds for rejecting some 
propositions of existing morality. Since morality includes only (can be correctly 
stated only by) true propositions, it follows that according to T2 and the identity 
assumption, morality includes grounds for believing that true propositions are 
false. Moreover, since according to T2 such moral criticism of existing morality 
can be successful, it follows that on these assumptions it is epistemically possible 
that certain moral propositions are false. 
The epistemic possibility entailed by T2 applies to people who know that 
existing morality is morality. For example, according to T2 and the identity 
assumption, a person, call him Michael, who believes in both must believe that 
it is possible given all he knows that certain propositions of existing morality are 
false. This commits him to believing that it is possible that morality contains 
propositions which are both true (because they correctly state the content of 
morality) and false (because there may be other-equally true-moral propositions 
providing adequate grounds to hold them to be false). Since this is impossible, 
Michael must reject either T2 or the identity assumption. Since Michael Walzer 
endorses T2, he is committed to rejecting the identity assumption. 
WHOSE MORALITY SHOULD BE INTERPRETED? 
The rejection of the identity assumption cannot be avoided by abandoning T2, 
for as we saw, T2 is essential for the plausibility of the interpretative thesis. Can 
the interpretative thesis survive the rejection of the identity assumption? One's 
intuitions suggest that it cannot. The interpretative thesis seems particularly 
This content downloaded from 128.059.178.073 on September 25, 2018 10:24:00 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Raz Review of Waizer 401 
appealing when understood as saying that moral arguments consist in the inter- 
pretation of morality. But perhaps in this form the thesis is too strong for its 
own good. Whether or not moral argument has anything to do with interpretation, 
it seems plausible that it proceeds from within morality (though not exclusively 
so). If it contains interpretation it is plausible that it should include interpretations 
of moral propositions. But putting matters in this way denudes the interpretative 
thesis, as understood by Walzer and its other supporters, of its point. It is bound 
to seem to them a trivialization of the thesis. Its poignancy derives from the point 
that moral argument is the interpretation of existing morality. This phrase is 
now too ambiguous for us to continue using it. As we saw, it suggests on the one 
hand that it is positively correlated to existing practices and to common beliefs 
and on the other hand that it is morality (i.e., that existing morality is morality). 
Having rejected the second point, let us replace "existing morality" with "social 
morality," a phrase whose use will remain suitably vague. The only definite 
commitment involved in its use is to a positive correlation between social morality 
and social practices and common beliefs. This correlation enables us to relate 
social morality to particular groups. They can be said to be the social moralities 
of the groups with whose practices and beliefs they correlate. I will refer to a 
social morality of an individual if the individual belongs to a group whose social 
morality it is. All these notions are very problematical, and if the interpretative 
thesis survives, they should all receive detailed scrutiny. 
Some familiar questions cannot be avoided. Whose social morality should 
be interpreted to produce a sound moral conclusion? Suppose that Adam is 
conversing with Angela about Beth's conduct or character. Is Adam's claim to 
be supported by an interpretation of his social morality or by that of Angela, or 
by that of Beth, or by some combination of the three? Walzer provides no answer, 
as his discussion assumes that all three share the same social morality. That 
assumption can always be relied upon only if one accepts the view, inimical to 
Walzer's thought, that there is and can only be one social morality. Given that 
there are several social moralities, and that it is possible and proper for people 
who belong to a group which has one social morality to form judgments concerning 
the character and conduct of people belonging to other groups with different 
social moralities, the familiar questions cannot be avoided. 
Let us consider first the possibility that Beth's social morality (i.e., the social 
morality of the group she is a member of) is the relevant one. This supposition 
has two unwelcome consequences: 
1. The interpretative thesis so understood, that is, that moral argument is 
an interpretation of the social morality of the person under discussion, is an 
incorrect interpretation of moral argument. One example will stand for many. 
Few, if any, of those members of the Western democracies or of other cultures 
(excluding the Chinese) who condemned in their hearts, in word, or in deed the 
Tienanmen Square Massacre of June 1989 regarded the interpretation of the 
relevant Chinese culture as their argument in defense of their condemnation. 
By and large, their position was: The massacre is inexcusable, and if Chinese 
social morality condones it, so much the worse for Chinese social morality. 
2. Either Hitler was right to adopt the Final Solution or he would have been 
right had he succeeded better to change his society after his own image. I am 
not alleging that the Final Solution was supported by the best interpretation of 
the German social morality of the time, nor am I claiming that if it was not, then 
it would have been relatively easy for the Nazis to intensify their actions so that 
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German social morality would have changed to suit their purposes. It is possible 
that such changes require long periods and are only under limited intentional 
control of anyone, however powerful. My point is merely that the interpretative 
thesis understood as requiring the interpretation of the social morality of the 
people whose conduct and character are under consideration creates the possibility 
that the Final Solution was just. Its justice becomes a contingent matter. It all 
depends on German social practices at the time. 
There is one way of escaping this second conclusion. One may endorse a 
view of how a social morality (or social practices) should be interpreted which 
makes it impossible to construct an interpretative argument supporting genocide 
on the basis of any social morality, be it what it may (alternatively, it may make 
it impossible to view genocide as supported by a social morality, whatever the 
practices and beliefs of the relevant community may be). The problem with this 
escape route is that it relies on methods of interpretation which are recommended 
on the ground that they rule out certain results."1 This means that certain moral 
claims (e.g., that genocide is wrong) are presupposed by the interpretative method 
and are not supported by it, which refutes the interpretative thesis.11 
Given these considerations, we can abandon the supposition that Beth's social 
morality is to be interpreted by arguments concerning her conduct or character. 
Let us then consider the possibility that it is Adam's social morality which counts. 
Given this supposition, the interpretative thesis has no bearing on the third 
intuition inspiring Walzer's writings on this issue, namely, the intuition that ours 
is not the only morally decent society. Given that even when we morally judge 
other people who belong to remote cultures we do so on the basis of the inter- 
pretation of our social morality, there is nothing in the interpretative thesis to 
lead to the moral pluralism favored by Walzer. The interpretative thesis can 
guarantee moral pluralism only if it requires us to interpret a plurality of social 
moralities. Since it does not do so, it does not in any obvious way respond to the 
pluralistic intuition. 
The difficulty with understanding the interpretative thesis as calling for the 
interpretation of the speaker's social morality is that it entails that moral truth 
is perspectival. The reason is simple and familiar. Adam and Angela may have 
different social moralities, whose interpretation may yield inconsistent verdicts 
on Beth's actions or character. Since moral claims well supported by an inter- 
pretation of the speaker's social morality are true, it follows either that morality 
is self-contradictory or that Adam's verdict on Beth is true for him, or rather for 
anyone who shares his perspective, and Angela's verdict is true for her, or rather 
for anyone who shares her perspective. That means that moral truth is perspectival. 
Each social morality defines a perspective and every speaker's truth holds only 
for those who share the same social morality. 
The only way to avoid this conclusion is to hold that people can form moral 
judgments only on people of the same social morality. But this would be a moral 
10. There is no logical necessity here, but I can think of no other reason why such 
morally biased methods of interpretation should be accepted. 
11. Cannot they both be yielded by the interpretative method and be used to support 
it? Such bootstrapping would be acceptable if it does not consist in a narrow circle. I do 
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judgment which, as the Tienanmen Square example shows, is not a true inter- 
pretation of my social morality. Therefore, this escape route is blocked.12 
The perspectival view of moral truth revives the problem illustrated by the 
example of the Final Solution in a somewhat different form. According to the 
perspectival view, it is possible that it is true for Hitler (i.e., for anyone who 
shares the perspective which is in fact his) that genocide is permissible, and that 
the Final Solution was morally required. It is true that for me this is false. But 
why should I care especially about what is true for me, rather than about what 
is true for Hitler? After all, it is his actions and character which are under 
consideration. Should we not judge him by what is true for him? Could he be 
blamed for not conforming to moral principles which are true for me but not 
for him? I raise these as genuine questions. Possibly truth just means that what 
matters to me is what is true for me. But the notion of perspectival truth is very 
obscure, and its credentials and implications have never been worked out properly. 
THE REFUTATION 
So far I have drawn attention to some of the implications of, and as yet unresolved, 
difficulties with the interpretative thesis. One consideration seems, however, to 
tell decisively against the thesis. As noted at the outset, regarding moral arguments 
as interpretative raises the question of interpreting "interpretation" in this context. 
But one thing about interpretation is clear: it is an intentional activity. 
We cannot interpret except when we intend to. Suppose that Angela (having 
earlier told him of a dream of hers) says something to Adam, to which he replies: 
"This could be the interpretation of your (i.e., Angela's) dream." In this case it 
was Adam's interpretation, not Angela's. She, admittedly, provided the content. 
But the intention to take it as an interpretation was Adam's. The same holds for 
any interpretation of a Shakespearean play, or of experimental scientific findings, 
or of the Soviet Union's European policy. Many things are possible interpretations. 
But one does not offer an interpretation just because one puts a possible inter- 
pretation forward. One has to offer it as an interpretation to be interpreting, 
though one may intend it as an interpretation under a different description. For 
example, one may intend to translate the speech, and one's translation is also 
an interpretation. Or one may intend to perform the piano sonata, and one's 
performance is also an interpretation. This is due to the fact that translations 
and performances are interpretations, and anyone who knows what they are 
knows that. Notice in particular that the fact that one was inspired by a poem 
to write another, or to write a piece of prose, does not make one's writing an 
interpretation of the poem. Interpretation cannot be explained in purely causal 
terms. It has to be meant as such. 
It follows that moral arguments are not interpretations, for they are not 
meant as such. Consider ordinary arguments against deceit. Deceit, people say, 
is unfair-it is taking unfair advantage of others. Or they will say that to deceive 
is to use a person and not to treat him as a person. Or they will say that deceit 
undermines trust and raises suspicions which make communication more difficult, 
to the long-term detriment of everyone. Various other arguments or variants on 
12. Could the proposition that people can morally criticize only those sharing their 
own social morality be supported as a nonmoral propositon, that is, on nonmoral grounds? 
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arguments will be advanced. But none of them is meant to be about the correct 
interpretation of our social morality. They do not even feel similar to arguments 
about the practices people have and the interpretation one should put on them. 
I do not deny that reference to social practices plays an important role in such 
arguments. The other day, while visiting another country, I said to my son: 
"Everyone asks me how you like it here and I have to say that I do not know." 
"But," he retorted, "no one expects a truthful answer to this question." If this 
is the expectation, then no one would be deceived by whatever I may say in reply 
to the question, and I need not worry that I do not know the correct answer. 
Practices are central to the question of when one is deceived. But they are 
only marginal to the question of why it is wrong to deceive. Similar considerations 
apply to defamation, violating property rights, insults, showing kindness, dem- 
onstrating one's love, pulling rank, etc. In other cases (e.g., causing serious bodily 
injury, denying people food, or exposing them to severe cold, etc.), practices 
figure hardly at all in moral arguments. Similar points apply to the examples 
used by Walzer, and cited above. Social practices are relevant for establishing 
facts about discrimination, its effects, and the most effective ways of combating 
it. It is less obvious what they have to do with justifying the underlying moral 
position, for example, that the state should take action to combat discrimination 
by, let us say, encouraging anyone who benefits from state funds to adopt certain 
policies, etc. There are, of course, social practices, which either conform to or 
are at odds with such views. But it is not clear why I or anyone else should be 
deterred from advocating a moral position which is at odds with the best inter- 
pretation of such policies. 
We know that people rarely advocate moral positions which do not have 
roots in the social morality of their community, past or present. That fact is often 
explained as relevant to their ability to gain access to the media, or to their 
rhetorical effectiveness with the public only. It seems to me plausible to assume 
that the rootedness in one's culture has greater significance. But even so, it does 
not follow that moral arguments are interpretations of social morality. To be 
that, they have to refer to social morality as a reason for a moral claim. This 
they do not normally do, except in the circumscribed way described. There are 
numerous analogies in other fields for a connectedness which cannot be explained 
in terms of reasons. There is more than an accidental connection between the 
nerve structure of my sense organs and my ability to see that the lamp in front 
of me is yellow. It does not follow and is, in fact, false, that the neural structure 
of my sense organs is a reason for believing that the lamp is yellow. 
One may object to this argument on the ground that it takes too much at 
face value. The interpretative thesis claims that the correct interpretation of what 
moral arguers intend is that they intend it as an interpretation of their social 
morality. There are two ways of developing this objection. The first is to allege 
that moral arguers, whatever their conscious intentions, have an unconscious 
intention to interpret their social morality. However, I know of no reason to 
believe in such an unconscious intent. More promising is the second way of 
developing the objection, which is to suggest that moral arguments which are 
meant to be discoveries of unknown moral truths, etc., are better understood if 
they are redescribed as interpretations. Therefore, they are intentional inter- 
pretations, but not under this description. 
The difficulty with this way of defending the thesis is that it does violence 
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but only on condition that the new description is such that those who understand 
know that if one applies, the other does as well. The redescription of an argument 
advanced as working out what is the only rational thing for a moral agent to do, 
or as working out God's will, etc., as an interpretation of the social morality, does 
not meet this condition. Among other considerations, such redescription, if ad- 
equate, denies one the possibility of criticizing those people for engaging in the 
wrong sort of argument. 
This argument shows only that not all moral arguments are interpretative. 
No one can claim that no moral argument is interpretative in part. As I suggested 
earlier, clearly, many are interpretative in part. But it can be shown that normal 
moral arguments are not entirely interpretative of social morality. To interpret 
is to put forward (under suitable conditions) something (such as a performance 
or a statement) as being or rendering the meaning of something. An interpretation 
of social morality is just that. It states the content (meaning) of social morality. 
This can be a moral argument only if morality is (identical with) social morality. 
As was shown earlier, it is not. Therefore, while the interpretation of social 
morality can play a role in moral argument, moral argument cannot consist of 
just such an interpretation. 
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